Regardless of a latest surge in terrorist assaults, the area is extra vulnerable to fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule.
Insecurity has risen sharply within the Sahel in latest months. Between late Might and early June, main assaults claimed by Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State within the Higher Sahara (ISGS) focused numerous areas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
This resurgence underscores the 2 teams’ adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counter-terrorism methods applied by the Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are involved in regards to the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall below jihadist management – drawing parallels to the December 2024 seize of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Nonetheless, there are vital contextual distinctions between the 2 situations. In contrast to HTS, which has persistently pursued regime change to place itself as a political-religious different, JNIM and ISGS present no intent to grab energy within the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou.
Relatively, their methods emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries the place they mediate native conflicts, implement norms and acquire taxes. This underscores their comparatively restricted operational capability. JNIM and ISGS primarily function in distant rural areas, utilizing gentle weapons resembling rifles, machine weapons, rocket launchers and mortars. In addition they utilise bikes, improvised explosive gadgets and weaponised civilian drones.
Though they’ve taken and briefly managed cities within the inside, resembling Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to maintain a chronic siege and occupation of a serious metropolis. Their power lies in mobility and native data relatively than the capability to occupy and govern territory for lengthy intervals.
HTS, in contrast, developed a structured navy drive with centralised command and tactical models able to coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained entry to stylish weaponry via well-organised transnational provide strains.
The autumn of Damascus represented the fruits of a broader regime-change dynamic set in movement by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to various levels, by some Western and Gulf nations. For some time, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – significantly with Turkey – that enabled the regular inflow of international fighters, medical help, munitions and superior weapons programs.
No comparable geopolitical structure exists within the Sahel. Whereas weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed teams, there is no such thing as a declared worldwide effort aimed toward toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
Though AES leaders ceaselessly accuse international actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the area, open-source knowledge affords little proof of this. Even Algeria, whose position in northern Mali has sometimes been ambivalenthas by no means sought to overthrow the federal government in Bamako.
One other level of distinction is the inner dynamics of state militaries. The autumn of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and in the end Damascus, occurred inside simply two weeks. This was primarily because of the restricted resistance by the Syrian Military – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating residing requirements.
In distinction, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian nations are rising. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally proof against jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Moreover, having assumed political energy, AES navy leaders have entrenched their authority throughout the state equipment, bolstering their accountability and accountability.
Additionally, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian inhabitants and financial collapse, additional aggravated by worldwide sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad’s authoritarian regime, many Syrians seen HTS as both a lesser evil or, in some circumstances, a extra beneficial different.
The Sahel state of affairs is starkly completely different. Though hardline Islamist ideologies have discovered some traction in city centres, public sentiment within the capital cities stays hostile in direction of jihadists who’re perceived as instigators of violence, instability and nationwide struggling.
For now, these elements collectively render the seize and sustained management of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces inconceivable. JNIM and ISGS will doubtless prohibit themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation ways.
As historical past exhibits, nevertheless, this doesn’t make these cities resistant to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by navy setbacks within the north. Equally, Burkina Faso’s January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties amongst safety forces.
Contemplating the AES nations’ protracted navy transitions and constrained political environments, additional upheavals resulting in institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of safety forces can’t be dominated out. This might have unpredictable penalties for the Sahel and West Africa at giant.
To keep away from this, AES governments should acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised method to terrorism. Whereas rising troop numbers and buying superior weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures have not incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world’s epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive 12 months, accounting for half of all world casualties.
The youthful look of the assailants within the foiled 2 June Timbuktu assault needs to be a wake-up name to AES strategists. It displays a technology of youngsters disadvantaged of education because of persistent insecurity, and whose households lack entry to earnings, justice and important social companies. These elements are potent drivers of recruitment into armed teams – and can’t be solved via navy means alone.
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AES governments want a coherent, region-wide counter-terrorism technique that goes past navy interventions. Worthwhile insights will be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin’s disengagement and reintegration programmesMauritania’s non secular dialogue initiativesand Algeria’s non-kinetic method. Equally vital is the necessity to interact with communities stigmatised by counter-terrorism operations, fostering belief and lowering the chance of recruitment.
Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Financial Group of West African States may bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capability to scale back the risk posed by armed teams.
With no significant recalibration of technique, the Sahel may descend into extended fragmentation, with profound penalties for West Africa’s stability.
DGJIBALE!Senior Researcher, ISS Regional Workplace for West Africa and the Sahel
Hassane KonéSenior Researcher, ISS Regional Workplace for West Africa and the Sahel
